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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Carlos Malvin Navarrette appeals from his judgment of conviction for second 
degree murder with a firearm enhancement. He asserts that the district court erred by 
denying his motion for a continuance based solely upon a telephone conversation the 
district court judge had with a witness, and erred by denying a motion for a mistrial after 
the prosecutor attempted to introduce hearsay evidence from this witness. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On October 19, 1009, Irving Romero was shot in a trailer park on Chinden in 
Garden City, Idaho. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.2.) 
Christina August and Holly Ruddell lived in the residence, although many others were 
over the night before. (PSI, p.2.) Those present on the morning of the incident were 
Ms. August and Holly Ruddell as well as Jennifer Israel and Elizabeth Chinea. (PSI. 
p.2.) 
Ms. Chinea was using methamphetamine regularly at the time. (Tr., p.640, Ls.7-
9.) Mr. Romero was her friend. (Tr., p.641, Ls.1-3.) She testified that on the morning 
of the incident, three males arrived in a pickup truck. (Tr., p.652, Ls.2-3.) They were 
identified at trial as Michael Stolp, Jesse Salinas, and Mr. Navarrette. (PSI, p.2.) She 
testified that she saw Mr. Salinas hand a gun to Mr. Navarrette. (Tr., p.664, Ls.3-7.) 
She testified that Mr. Navarrette and Mr. Stolp went into the back room where 
Mr. Romero was. (Tr., p.668, Ls. 15-17.) Ms. Chinea testified that Mr. Navarrette shot 
Mr. Romero when they were out on the porch. (Tr., p.676, Ls.13-22.) 
1 
However, when she was interviewed by the police, she told them that a man 
named Anthony, not Mr. Navarrette, shot IVlr. Romero. (Tr., p.681, Ls.8-15.) Later, at 
trial, Ms. Chinea said that she made Anthony up. (Tr., p.684, Ls.10-11.) She also 
never told the police or the grand jury that Mr. Salinas gave a gun to Mr. Navarrette. 
(Tr., p.692, Ls.8-23) She told the police she did not know who the driver was and she 
testified at trial that it was Mr. Navarrette; she also stated and that she was previously 
trying to protect Mr. Salinas. (Tr., p.693, Ls.1-25.) 
Jennifer Israel also testified. She testified that at the time of the incident, she 
"was homeless. And currently at that time I was using methamphetamine and I was 
living just anywhere I could stay, find food, anywhere I could eat." (Tr., p.728, Ls.11-
15.) She testified that when she was interviewed by the police after the incident, she, 
too, lied to them. (Tr., p.747, Ls.12-20.) She told the police that she did not see the 
suspect's face at all and did not see a weapon in his hand. (Tr., p.764, Ls.13-21.) 
However, she testified that Mr. Navarrette told Mr. Romero, "you know what you did and 
it's time to go." (Tr., p.751, Ls.14-17.) She testified that she tried to swipe the gun 
away from Mr. Navarrette, but he pushed her off and then shot Mr. Romero. (Tr., p.753, 
L.12 - p.754, L.2.) 
Holly Ruddell, who lived at the residence, initially told the police that she was not 
even present at the scene because she had been in Nampa all morning. (Tr., p.904, 
Ls.17-25.) However, at trial she testified that she was present when the three men 
arrived at the residence that morning, and that she saw Mr. Navarrette push 
Mr. Romero off the porch and turned around when she heard a gunshot. (Tr., p.929, 
Ls.1-18.) She did not, however, see who had the gun. (Tr., p.929, Ls.19-21.) She was 
also under the influence of methamphetamine at the time. (Tr., p.931, Ls.10-13.) 
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Ms. Ruddell, who was currently in jail, was also hoping to have her drug court 
transferred to Twin Falls, though she would not say if the thought the prosecutor would 
"put in a good word for her." (Tr., p.941, Ls.17 - p.942, L.21.) 
Daniel Brown, who knew Mr. Navarrette because "he has kids with my cousin," 
also testified. (Tr., p.825, Ls?-10.) He testified that on the morning of the incident, 
Mr. Navarrette asked him to go to his house and asked him to clean a pistol because it 
had been jamming. (Tr., p.833, Ls.17-19.) Mr. Brown took the gun into the bathroom, 
took it apart, and washed it with soapy water. (Tr., p.833, Ls.21-25.) He testified that 
before he arrived, Mr. Navarrette asked him to turn on the news and the police scanner. 
(Tr., p.836, Ls.8-11.) When Mr. Brown asked Mr. Navarrette if he knew what he had 
done was wrong, Mr. Navarrette said no. (Tr., p.836, Ls.17-22.) Mr. Brown then took a 
screwdriver and ran it down the barrel of the gun, trying to mess up the rifling so that it 
could not be traced back to the gun. (Tr., p.838, Ls.1-7.) Right before Mr. Navarrette 
left, he told Mr. Brown, "I got him." (Tr., p.839, Ls.21-25.) 
On his way home, a tote bag fell off the seat and opened up, revealing the pistol. 
(Tr., p.840, Ls.5-12.) When Mr. Navarrette did not return to get the pistol, Mr. Brown put 
it in a gravel pit where he worked. (Tr., p.846, Ls.21-25.) On October 21, two days 
after the incident, Mr. Brown took the police officers to the pit and showed them the gun. 
(Tr., p.827, Ls18-22.) However, when the officers first arrived on October 20 to discuss 
this case with them, he denied everything. (Tr., p.853, Ls.3-4) He also told the police 
that at around 10:00 pm on the evening of the incident, Mr. Navarrette came back to his 
place to get a tattoo finished, and Mr. Navarrette stated, "man, it's too bad somebody 
got him before I did." (Tr., p.868, Ls.18-20.) 
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Janet Wallace a friend of Mr. Navarrette's, testified that she asked Mr. Navarrette 
if he killed someone, and Mr. Navarrette stated that, "he did it, that he did it but he did 
not mean for things to go that way. And then he began to explain the reasons. 
(Tr., p.883, Ls.16-19.) She testified that Mr. Navarrette told her that Mr. Romero had 
been passing around pictures, "talking shit about him," and called him a "punk bitch." 
(Tr., p.883, Ls.21-25.) 
Mr. Navarrette testified that on the day of the incident, he woke up around 10:30 
and left his residence with Mr. Stolp. (Tr., p.1411, Ls.17-21.) He said that the two of 
them went to a friend named Anthony's residence. (Tr., p.1412, Ls.20-25.) Another 
individual named Vaughn was also present. (Tr., p.1413, Ls.12-14.) Mr. Navarrette 
testified that he stayed at Anthony's residence until about 1:00. (Tr., p.1413, Ls.18-19.) 
He then went back to his place, and then was told by Mr. Stolp that "Liz was saying that 
I shot somebody." (Tr., p.1414, Ls.14-15.) He stated that he called Mr. Brown and 
asked him to turn on the news and the police scanner because he wanted to know if it 
was true that Liz was saying this. (Tr., p.1416, Ls.1-3.) Mr. Navarrette stated that they 
got high and "Daniel asked if he could clean the gun because he's the type of person 
when you get high he tweaks out on things." (Tr., p.1417, Ls.4-6.) When asked about 
his alleged confession to Ms. Wallace, he stated that what he actually said was, "you're 
the third person that said that today." (Tr., p.1437, Ls.15-16.) 
Mr. Navarrette was charged with second degree murder and an enhancement for 
using a firearm during the commission of a felony. Approximately a week before trial, 
counsel for Mr. Navarrette was "compelled to ask for a continuance." (6/25/2010 
Tr., p.6, Ls.22-25.) Counsel informed the court that he was reluctant to make such a 
request because he knew the court did not want to continue the trial, but, "our alibi 
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witness left town as we had said before. He's in California. He refuses to return our 
phone calls, so we're without this witness. And the only thing we do is use the statutory 
means of subpoenaing him out of state." (6/25/2010 Tr., p.7, Ls.1-5.) The district court 
denied this motion based solely on a telephone conversation it had with this witness, 
Anthony Henderson. (6/25/2010 Tr., p.31, Ls.7-13.) 
During cross-examination of Mr. Navarrette, the prosecutor referenced this 
confirmation and then asked Mr. Navarrette if Mr. Henderson agreed with his alibi. 
(Tr., p.1472, Ls.1-21.) Mr. Navarrette objected on the basis of confrontation and 
hearsay; the prosecutor acknowledged that the objection was "well taken," agreed to 
have the question stricken from the record, and moved on to another issue. 
Mr. Navarrette moved for a mistrial, which was denied. (Tr., p.1475, Ls.14-15.) 
Mr. Navarrette was convicted of second degree murder and an enhancement for 
using a firearm during the commission of a felony. (R., p.182.) The district court 
imposed a unified sentence of life, with thirty years fixed. (R., p.183.) He now appeals, 
and asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a 
continuance and erred by denying his motion for a mistrial. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Navarrette's motion 
for a continuance? 
2. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Navarrette's motion for a mistrial? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Navarrette's Motion For A 
Continuance 
A Introduction 
Mr. Navarrette asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his 
motion for a continuance based solely on a telephone conversation it had with Anthony 
Henderson where he was not placed under oath. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Navarrette's Motion 
For A Continuance 
Approximately a week before trial, counsel for Mr. Navarrette was "compelled to 
ask for a continuance." (6/25/2010 Tr., p.6, Ls.22-25.) Counsel informed the court that 
he was reluctant to make such a request because he knew the court did not want to 
continue the trial, but, "our alibi witness left town as we had said before. He's in 
California. He refuses to return our phone calls, so we're without this witness. And the 
only thing we do is use the statutory means of subpoenaing him out of state." 
(6/25/2010 Tr., p.7, Ls.1-5.) 
The district court initially recognized the importance of this witness: 
[l]f we're unable to get Mr. Henderson up here to testify in this trial, then 
with great reluctance and I think prejudice to the state, the court is going to 
have to reset the case, so that the defense has every opportunity to try to 
locate Mr. Henderson, get him served with subpoena and get him here to 
testify. 
I think I have no choice but to give the defendant that opportunity, but I am 
very conflicted on it because we also have the victim and the victim's 
family on the other side, as well as witnesses. A lot of witnesses have 
already been subpoenaed to come to court. All of those individuals are 
going to be put out because of one witness, Mr. Henderson, who doesn't 
appear to be cooperating right now. 
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(6/25/2010 Tr., p.21, Ls.10-25.) The district court came up with an unusual idea to deal 
with this situation: "Well, do you have a phone number for him?" (6/25/2010 Tr., p.13, 
Ls.14-15.) "Let's call him. Let's call him." (6/25/2010 Tr., p.14, Ls.17-18.) Counsel for 
Mr. Navarrette then went to retrieve the phone number. (6/25/2010 Tr., p.13, Ls.23-24.) 
The district court then left a voicemail message for Mr. Henderson. (6/25/2010 Tr.17, 
p.17, Ls.15-20.) 
Mr. Henderson returned the telephone call. (6/25/2010 Tr., p.25, Ls.2-5.) The 
district court judge asked if he would provide an alibi for Mr. Navarrette, and 
Mr. Henderson stated that he wished to withdraw as a witness "due to the fact that my 
family is my number one priority right now, and I don't want to be involved with any 
more of this at all." (6/25/2010 Tr., p.26, Ls.10-14.) He continued, 
And, you know, I personally don't want to be involved anymore with all 
this, and, you know, I don't think - well, my number one priority is my 
family right now, and that's it. And that's all I want to do, you know. That 
[sic] all I want right now. 
And this is, you know, is really hampering my ability to do that. I mean, 
I've been in rehab for 30 days because of all - you know, not specifically 
because of this case, but just in my, you know, in my involvement with just 
making bad decisions in my life, okay? 
(6/25/2010 Tr., p.27, Ls.14-25.) At this point, the district court stated, "Mr. Henderson, I 
really appreciate you taking time to talk to me, and I know it's hard for you to do that. I 
need to ask you a question." (6/25/2010 Tr., p.28, Ls.1-4.) The court then asked if he 
would be able to provide an alibi, and Mr. Henderson said, "Well, at this point, I'm not 
saying anything. So I don't want to be involved with this anymore." (6/25/201 O 
Tr., p.28, Ls.10-12.) The court then demanded an answer: 
Okay, you've to answer the question. You've got to answer the question. 
You've got to tell me, is that a true statement, or is it not a true statement, 
that you and Mr. Navarrette were together at his house at the time of the 
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alleged murder - at your house? Excuse me. Let me ask you the 
question again, and answer yes or no. 
Were you and Mr. Navarrette together at your house at the time fo the 
alleged murder? Can you answer that yes or no? 
(6/25/2010 Tr., p.28, Ls.13-20.) Mr. Henderson then said that they were not together at 
that time. (6/25/2010 Tr., p.28, L.24.) 
Based upon this telephone conversation, where Mr. Henderson was neither 
present in court nor sworn in to provide testimony, the district court concluded, 
"Mr. Anthony Henderson does not appear to be an alibi witness. So based on that, it 
appears the reason for the second continuance, in order to obtain the testimony of 
Mr. Henderson, that has now gone away, so I'll state that on the record ... " (6/25/2010 
Tr., p.31, Ls.7-13.) Mr. Navarrette asserts that the district court abused its discretion by 
denying the motion for a continuance. 
"The granting or denial of a motion for a continuance is vested in the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been a 
clear abuse of discretion." State v. Saunders, 124 Idaho 334, 336-37 (Ct. App. 1993) . 
When evaluating a claim that the trial court has abused its discretion, the sequence of 
inquiry is: first, whether the district court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; second, whether the district court acted within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
available to it; and finally, whether the district court reached its decision by an exercise 
of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94 (1991 ). 
The denial of a motion for continuance is not an abuse of discretion unless it can be 
shown that the substantial rights of the defendant have been prejudiced. Saunders, 124 
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Idaho at 337. Mr. Navarrette asserts that the district court did not reach its decision 
through an exercise of reason. 
First, the district court based its decision solely on the basis of Mr. Henderson's 
unsworn statements over the telephone. 'The basic purpose behind an oath is to affirm 
the import and necessity of telling the truth." State v. Nunez, 138 Idaho 636, 641 
(2003). "The judicial system expects and relies on truthful testimony." Id. The 
seriousness of sworn testimony is made clear by the fact that there are legal 
repercussions for failing to provide truthful testimony. In Idaho, perjury is a felony 
offense carrying with it a sentence of one to fourteen (14) years. I.C. § 18-5409. 
"Perjury" is defined under Idaho law as follows: 
Every person, having taken an oath that he will testify, declare, 
depose, or certify truly, before any competent tribunal, legislative 
committee, officer, or person in any of the cases in which such an oath by 
law may be administered, willfully and contrary to such oath, states as true 
any material matter which he knows to be false, is guilty of perjury. 
I.C. § 18-5401 (emphasis added). An individual may be prosecuted for perjury if the 
false statements are made under oath, which only serves to reinforce the seriousness of 
the oath. 
Mr. Henderson was never placed under oath. He was simply having a telephone 
conversation with an Idaho judge while he was in California. The procedure usually 
used to ensure truthfulness was not utilized at all in this case. As such, Mr. Henderson's 
statements should be reviewed with greater scrutiny than those that are made under 
oath. 
Second, even accepting Mr. Henderson's statements at face value, the district 
court still did not reach its conclusion through an exercise of reason. Before the 
telephone conversation took place, counsel for Mr. Navarrette informed the judge that 
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Mr. Henderson had previously cooperated but had then become uncooperative. The 
fact that he gave statements unfavorable to Mr. Navarrette should, therefore, have 
come as no surprise. And it was clear that Mr. Henderson had another reason to be 
uncooperative - he had recently moved to California with his family for rehab and did 
not want to be bothered any this case at all. Mr. Henderson made it very clear that he 
believed any involvement in this case might have adverse repercussions for him, 
including for his rehabilitation in California. 
Had Mr. Henderson been subpoenaed to testify, it is very possible that he would 
have become cooperative again because he would be coming back to Idaho regardless. 
Further, the record shows that at one point, Mr. Henderson was cooperative and had 
done an interview with defense counsel's investigator. Had Mr. Henderson testified at 
trial, under oath, and denied that Mr. Navarrette was with him, he could have been 
impeached with his prior statements which were apparently helpful to Mr. Navarrette's 
defense. The jury could then have decided whether Mr. Navarrette had an alibi and if 
Mr. Henderson only changed his version of events to prevent from being involved in this 
case at all. 
The district court based its decision solely on unsworn statements from 
IVlr. Henderson. The fact that he provided unfavorable information at the hearing came 
as no surprise, as Mr. Henderson just wanted to get away from this case and be with his 
family. Mr. Navarrette knew that he was being uncooperative but still felt a continuance 
was necessary to subpoena Mr. Henderson. Had he testified that he was not with 
Mr. Navarrette, he could have been impeached with any prior statements he made that 
were favorable to Mr. Navarrette. Under these circumstances, Mr. Navarrette submits 
that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a continuance. 
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11. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Navarrette's Motion For A Mistrial 
A Introduction 
Mr. Navarrette asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion for a 
mistrial after the prosecutor sought hearsay evidence that went to the heart of his 
defense - his alleged alibi with Mr. Henderson. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Navarrette's Motion For A Mistrial 
Mr. Navarrette testified at trial and stated that on the date and time in question, 
he was at Anthony Henderson's residence. (Tr., p.1471, Ls.3-6.) The following 
exchange then happened on cross-examination: 
Q. Now Anthony's in California, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You were present with all of us, well, with your counsel and 
myself and Mr. Naugle and the court staff, when there was a 
hearing about whether we'd have this trial now or move this trial so 
that you could try to get Anthony back from California, is that fair? 
A Yes. 
Q. And in order to do that we had a speakerphone with Anthony, 
right? 
A Yes. 
Q. And did the court have some questions with him about where 
he was on this particular day on the 19th of October? 
A That the what? 
Q. The 19th of October? 
A Did who have questions? 
Q. The court. 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And he doesn't agree with you, does he? 
(Tr., p.1472, Ls.1-21.) At this point, counsel for Mr. Navarrette objected. (Tr., p.1472, 
Ls.22-24.) Once the jury was excused, counsel articulated the basis for the objection: 
Apparently, he's determined to make a mistrial here. I'm just appalled. 
It's a hearsay confrontation objection concerning that. It's sufficient to say 
that Anthony refuses to come up here, but what Anthony said on the 
phone? I mean it's one thing to say that the man won't come up here; it is 
quite another to say that- the content of what he said to you. 
(Tr., p.1473, Ls.11-18.) The court responded, "the point is he's saying Anthony is his 
alibi, I was with Anthony the whole time. And we know that Anthony told us that 
Mr. Navarrette was not with him." (Tr., p.1473, Ls.24-25.) Counsel then pointed out, 
"we don't know why he said that either. It's equally possible that he said that so he 
wouldn't have to come up here, because that's what he kept telling us, that he doesn't 
want to come up here. But that's a hearsay confrontation problem over the phone." 
(Tr., p.1474, Ls.2-7.) 
The State then conceded that the question was improper, stating, "I guess 
counsel's hearsay objection is well taken. If you want to instruct the jury to strike that 
comment, that's fine. It wasn't where I was intending to go, but I can see the way the 
question was phrased." (Tr., p.147 4, Ls.16-20.) The prosecutor then stated that he 
would move on to a different subject, but that, "my point is that he is saying something 
that that his court has heard conflicting testimony about." (Tr., p.1474, Ls.23-25.) 
Counsel for Mr. Navarrette then pointed out, 
It wasn't testimony; it was stupid statement on a phone call that was itself 
unusual. I mean, it's obvious to the jury that Anthony Henderson is not 
going to be here because he's not going to be here. What more does he 
need? But to have him put in front of the jury that - that he doesn't agree 
with Carlos . . . It's made by somebody on a phone call outside the 
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presence of the court, certainly not under oath or anything of that nature, 
and it's not something he said. 
(Tr., p.1475, Ls.2-18.) The prosecutor then agreed to have his question stricken. 
(Tr., p.1475, Ls.1-4.) Not believing this to be the appropriate remedy, counsel for 
Mr. Navarrette moved for a mistrial. (Tr., p.1475, Ls.14-15.) Despite the fact that the 
prosecutor acknowledged that the question was inappropriate, the district court stated, 
"[t)hat's a true statement. That's true. I know that to be true because that's what 
Mr. Henderson said over the phone, that he does not agree with Mr. Navarrette that 
Mr. Navarrette was at his house at the time of this incident. That's a true statement." 
(Tr., p.1477, Ls.19-24.) The court denied the mistrial on the basis that the prosecutor 
was withdrawing the question. (Tr., p.1478, Ls.3-5.) 
Motions for a mistrial are governed by Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1. The Rule 
states, in relevant part, "[a] mistrial may be declared upon motion of the defendant, 
when there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct 
inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the 
defendant of a fair trial." I.C.R. 29.1. 
The standard of review when a district court denies a motion for a mistrial is well 
established. 
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably 
exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial 
motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether the event which 
precipitated the motion for mistrial represented reversible error when 
viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion for mistrial 
has been denied in a criminal case, the "abuse of discretion" standard is a 
misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is one of reversible 
error. Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident 
that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to declare a 
mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, 
constituted reversible error. 
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State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908 (2003) (quoting State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 
54, 57 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95 (Ct. App. 1983))). 
Mr. Navarrette acknowledges that the district court sustained the objection and 
instructed the jury to disregard the statement and that this Court presumes that the jury 
followed the district court's instructions. See State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 751 
(Ct. App. 1997); State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478, 481 (Ct. App. 1996). The Court of 
Appeals, however, has recently recognized that in some instances, this is not a 
sufficient remedy. See State v. Keyes, 150 Idaho 543 (Ct. App. 2011 ). In the context of 
an expert witness opining as to the defendant's guilt, the court held that, "in a close 
case a corrective instruction, even one that is forceful, might be insufficient to cure the 
prejudicial effect of the improper opinion." Id. at 545. Mr. Navarrette submits that this is 
such a case, and because the improper questioning went to the heart of 
Mr. Navarrette's defense - his alibi, the corrective instruction was insufficient and a 
mistrial should have been granted. 
In this case, the State conceded, and Mr. Navarrette agrees, that the prosecutor 
was eliciting hearsay. (Tr., p.1474, Ls.16-17.) However, he submits that, despite the 
fact that the question was stricken, a mistrial should have been granted. Because 
Mr. Navarrette moved for a mistrial and preserved the issue, the burden is on the State 
to prove that the error was harmless. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). 
There was no dispute in this case that Mr. Romero was shot and killed. The only 
dispute was who was responsible, and Mr. Navarrette's defense was that he was not 
guilty because he somewhere else, namely at Anthony Henderson's residence. This 
questioning went to the only disputed issue in the case - Mr. Navarrette's whereabouts 
on the day in question. And the jury was likely to conclude that Mr. Henderson had 
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previously testified under oath that Mr. Navarrette was with him because the jury would 
assume that a witness would be placed under oath if they were going to provide 
information to the court - generally, a safe assumption. But even beyond the obvious 
problem that Mr. Henderson was not actually placed under oath as the jury would 
assume, the jury also would simply assume that Mr. Henderson had always denied that 
he was with Mr. Navarrette. That is not the case. 
At the hearing on the motion for a continuance, counsel for Mr. Navarrette 
informed the court that, initially, Mr. Henderson was very cooperate and that he was 
interviewed by counsel's investigator. (6/25/2010 Tr., p.8, Ls.4-5.) During his 
questioning by the court, Mr. Henderson stated that he wished to withdraw as a witness 
"due to the fact that my family is my number one priority right now, and I don't want to 
be involved with any more of this at all." (6/25/2010 Tr., p.26, Ls.10-14.) He continued, 
And, you know, I personally don't want to be involved anymore with all 
this, and, you know, I don't think - well, my number one priority is my 
family right now, and that's it. And that's all I want to do, you know. That 
[sic] all I want right now. 
And this is, you know, is really hampering my ability to do that. I mean, 
I've been in rehab for 30 days because of all - you know, not specifically 
because of this case, but just in my, you know, in my involvement with just 
making bad decisions in my life, okay? 
(6/25/2010 Tr., p.27, Ls.14-25.) The jury did not know that Mr. Henderson had initially 
been cooperative and that the primary reason for his not testifying was that he was in 
rehab in California and wanted nothing to do with this case anymore. They would 
inevitably been left with the impression that Mr. Henderson had testified in court that he 
was not with Mr. Navarette, and therefore Mr. Navarrette was testifying contrary to the 
sworn testimony of his alibi witness. 
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Because the prosecutor's questions went to the heart of Mr. Navarrette's defense 
and would inevitably have led the jury to believe that Mr. Henderson had testified under 
oath that he would not provide an alibi for IVlr. Navarrette, Mr. Navarrette submits that 
the corrective instruction was insufficient to address the error. The district court erred 
by denying the motion for a mistrial and Mr. Navarrette's conviction should be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Navarrette requests that his judgment of conviction be vacated and his case 
remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this 15th day of August, 2011. 
JUSTIN M. CURTIS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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